By Alan Schwarz
January 23, 2005

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See Also:
• Great Moments In Contract History
• A General Manager And An Agent Chime In
• 10 Killer Contracts . . . And Ten That Killed

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MOVIN' ON UP  Year  Average MLB Salary Minimum MLB Salary Per Capita Income (U.S.) 2004 $2,486,609 $300,000 n/a 2003 2,555,476 300,000 $31,459 2002 2,383,235 200,000 30,795 2001 2,654,403 200,000 30,580 2000 1,998,034 200,000 29,847 1999 1,720,050 200,000 27,939 1998 1,441,406 170,000 26,883 1997 1,383,578 150,000 25,334 1996 1,176,967 109,000 24,175 1995 1,071,029 109,000 23,076 1994 1,188,679 109,000 22,172 1993 1,120,254 109,000 21,346 1992 1,084,408 109,000 20,854 1991 891,188 100,000 19,892 1990 578,930 100,000 19,477 1989 512,084 68,000 18,520 1988 438,729 62,500 17,331 1987 412,454 62,500 16,240 1986 412,520 60,000 15,442 1985 371,571 60,000 14,758 1984 329,408 40,000 13,891 1983 289,194 35,000 12,618 1982 241,497 33,500 11,935 1981 185,651 32,500 11,246 1980 143,756 30,000 10,114 1979 113,558 21,000 9,146 1978 99,876 21,000 8,245 1977 76,066 19,000 7,405 1976 51,501 19,000 6,754 1975 44,676 16,000 6,172 1974 40,839 15,000 5,707 1973 36,566 15,000 5,231 1972 34,092 13,500 4,717 1971 31,543 12,750 4,342 1970 29,303 12,000 4,085 1969 24,909 10,000 3,836 1968 n/a 10,000 n/a 1967 19,000 $6,000 n/a Sources: Associated Press, Baseball1.com, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

No baseball onlooker, whether fan or writer or player or executive, can watch a free-agent season without at least once muttering, "What are they doing? I can do a better deal than that."

Few who make such proclamations actually know all the balls that must be juggled for a prospective deal to go from brainstorm to bargain. From club flexibility to player security, from options to incentives, from bonuses to buyouts, almost every part of a contract is subject to hemming and hawing from each side pursuing its interests and protecting its hide. And not in a vacuum, either. Similar negotiations are crisscrossing the major leagues, with different teams and agents playing one against the other in a tangled web that makes airline flight maps look simple.

Getting a deal done requires both player and club to sort out priorities in at least a half-dozen arenas. The following primer presents the tallest hurdles they must clear to wind up first at the finish line:

SALARY

It's pretty easy to zone in on a player's market: Simply compare his performance to that of other players at his position and adjust his salary relative to theirs. Deciding which statistics to use is a matter of debate, of course, but there are bigger problems than that.

The main issue is that what a player has produced is not necessarily what he will produce. A 28-year-old player is far more likely to maintain his skills than a 35-year-old one. It's here that each side will play to its strengths. A club will try not to be seduced by an aging player's past, while a young player will emphasize his potential.

When comparing players, salary for any specific season matters less than the average annual value of the contract, which is defined as guaranteed money (including signing bonus and option buyouts) divided by seasons covered. For example, even though Barry Bonds will earn $20 million in 2005, he's typically characterized as an $18 million player by virtue of his five-year, $90 million deal.

Generally, salary level is less of a sticking point than . . .

LENGTH

It's here that teams and players most lock horns. Players, understandably, want to extend their salaries through as many years as possible. Teams, on the other hand, don't want to commit top dollar for too long, fearing a player's decline in performance, predictable or not.

Club executives have become much more reluctant to sign deals that extend far into the future. While hard data isn't available, recent history suggests that deals are averaging about one season less than they did several years ago. Too many clubs have been caught with bad money on the books to not be more careful; non-collusive advice from the commissioner's office has educated teams as well.

The catchword today is "flexibility," with clubs ensuring that enough of their contracts expire each year to allow them options on the open market. A shorter contract for a higher salary is often preferred over one for a year too long. For example, Carlos Delgado's $17 million average annual value from 2001-2004 was high, but at least Toronto's deal ended this year. Toronto certainly prefers that over a $16 million AAV extending through 2005.

Many deals get done when a team steps forward and commits to one more year than the competition. As Jon Lieber's agent, Rex Gary, told the New York Times: "Players, if they like a place, generally want to know that they're going to be there for a while."

Then again, they rarely offer to accept much less money for that security, leaving the club to determine what length will ultimately be worth the investment. As Pat Gillick once put it, "I don't mind paying a player, but I don't want to pay for his funeral."

BONUS/STRUCTURE

A $32 million, four-year deal rarely calls for $8 million salaries each of four years. The payout structure is negotiated as well, based on cash-flow concerns of the parties.

Players often want up-front money in the form of a signing bonus, though this isn't always the case. Someone going through a divorce might want no bonus depending on his state's laws regarding community property. The team generally wants to structure the deal based on its commitments to other players over the next several years.

Doing backloaded deals, where most of the money comes late in the contract, or deals with salaries deferred past the contract term is attractive for many clubs, not just because they pay less for the player now but because it reduces the today's-dollar value of the deal. Then again, such contracts can haunt them by hamstringing their budgets years past the players' productivity. (See the Arizona Diamondbacks.) In the end, with most top free-agent contracts calling for higher salaries near the end of the deal, players--most of whom will be past their prime--deliver considerably more production per dollar at the beginning of the contract.

"This is probably an area dictated more by the club than the player," Astros president Tal Smith said. "It has to worry about payroll and previous signings. More clubs are taking the lead of spelling out what they want to do."

OPTIONS/BUYOUTS

A way to create value on either side is to build in an option year or two. This is flexibility in another form, either for the club or player.

Many contracts today include club options. In that case, at the end of the deal, the club has the choice of renewing it for one more year at a prescribed salary (usually a rough estimate of the player's worth at that point). This is how the Red Sox are keeping Bill Mueller this year, the Astros Craig Biggio, etc. Should the team wish to cut ties, it usually must pay the player a buyout--glorified severance pay.

This allows teams to retain bargains or avoid bloated deals. Had Houston decided to part ways with Biggio and not pick up his $3 million option, for example, the buyout was $1 million; they decided he was worth the extra $2 million. The Mets, on the other hand, faced with a whopping $15 million option on Richard Hidalgo, chose the $2 million buyout instead.

Player options are less common but still handy. "Sometimes if you convince a player to take a lesser value deal you give him the chance to get out of it," Giants assistant GM Ned Colletti says. "A three-year deal with one or two player options can give him peace of mind. It's a built-in opt-out clause."

NO-TRADE CLAUSE

A few years ago, when teams were rolling in money and couldn't imagine ever being hamstrung, no-trade clauses were doled out far more often than they are now. Once again, teams try to protect their flexibility.

The player wields leverage here by claiming that if he's going to make a commitment to a team for four or five years, he wants the same in return. However, clubs typically will not give full no-trade clauses anymore unless the player is clearly accepting a lower average annual value to play in a certain city. Negotiations often compromise with a no-trade clause for only a few seasons of the deal, or allowing a player to submit a list at the beginning of each season specifying some teams to which he could veto a trade.

"It makes no sense to give someone max dollars, max length and a no-trade," one NL GM said. "You do that, you're screwed. I only give a no-trade to a guy who's giving me a break."

AWARDS/INCENTIVES

These clauses break down into two main groups: those that reward health and those that reward performance.

Particularly with a player who has been recently injured, the team will protect itself by paying him less of an average annual value but build in a bonus structure depending on how much he plays. For example, the Giants have Jason Schmidt for four years at a $7.5 million, but have twice increased his base salary by $250,000 when he has pitched more than 200 innings. Whether based on innings for pitchers or at-bats for hitters, these clauses reduce clubs' risk and help ensure they pay for what they receive. (Sometimes, reaching certain levels trigger or vest entire options, implying the player has proven he is healthy or worthy of that salary.)

Performance bonuses, meanwhile, give the player extra money for winning an award or honor. Bonds and Vladimir Guerrero received $500,000 from the Giants and Angels, respectively, for winning this year's MVP awards. Others are for honors far less rare, like Manny Ramirez' $100,000 for winning Silver Slugger awards each of the last four years. Some clubs view these incentive packages as routine, while others, like the Yankees, make a policy of not offering them at all.